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The Relationship between a Measure of Dogmatism and 
Retention of Rogerian and Skinnerian Concepts 
by 
Richard A. Carpenter, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1975 
Major Professor: Dr. Elwin Nielsen 
Department: Psychology 
vi 
The present study attempted to investigate the relationship between a 
subject's degree of dogmatism and his attitudes towards the different theoretical 
positions held by B. F. Skinner and Carl Rogers regarding the control of man. 
This study utilized selective retention as an indicator of subjects' attitudes. 
No significant difference was found between Skinner's and Rogers' on their 
retention of high, medium, and low dogmatism groups. There was also a 
non-significant correlation between subjects' scores on the retention of 
Sinner's and Rogers' concept and subjects' dogmatism scores. 
(80 pages) 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
The construct of dogmatism has been the focus of a great deal of 
research since Milton Rokeach published The Open and Closed Mind in 1960. 
It has been a useful construct in attempting to conceptualize the com-
ponents of different behaviors. For instance, Di.Renzo, G. (1968) used dogmatism 
to help understand citizens' voting behavior in the 1964 election. It may well be 
a construct that would be useful in helping to clarify and understand why different 
people identify with and are attracted to different schools of psychology. 
People who choose different types of therapy have been shown to share 
some common personality traits (Jacobson, 1970). Jacobson found that Ss who 
chose behavior therapy (the applied segment of the school of behaviorism) "were 
on the average more dependent, more authoritarian, and more externally 
oriented than Ss choosing analytically oriented therapy." Perhaps had Jacobson 
used dogmatism as a variable in her study she may have also found that these Ss 
may have had higher scoreR on that test. 
Wallen (1968) attempted to determine the extent to which the degree of 
dogmatism possessed by the counselee influenced the counselee' s preference 
for directive vs. non-directive counseling. He found that relatively close-
minded subjects expressed a significantly greater preference for a counselor 
who was directive, while the relatively open-minded subjects expressed a 
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significantly greater preference for a counselor who was non-directive. Maybe 
naive subjects who vary on their degree of closed mindedness vs open minded-
ness have the same sort of preferences regarding the more controlling views of 
behaviorism and the less controlling, non-directive client-centered approach. 
Recently, Ryand and Gizynski (1971) investigated, post hoc, clients' 
feelings about their behavior therapist and their behavior therapy. They found 
that subjects were split in terms of their different degree of attraction to the 
behavioral approach. Those with positive feelings about the approach saw it as 
scientific, direct, quick; while those with negative feelings viewed it as cold 
and domineering. Ryan and Gizynski reported that these results were probably 
due to a congruence between clients' attitudes and certain elements of the treat-
ment as , for example, therapist direction and control of sessions. 
It can be inferred from both the Ryan and Gizynski study and the 
Jacobson study that people have 1d.liffering perceptions and attitudes towards the 
different branches of psychology. Perhaps, had both of these studies measured 
the subjects' levels of dogmatism, they might have shown that those subjects 
who liked or chose behavior therapy were more dogmatic than the other subjects. 
Carl Rogers is the recognized leader of an applied form of phenomeno-
logy called the client-centered approach. The basic premise of non-directive-
ness of client makes this approach less directive than behavior therapy. It 
could be perceived, therefore, as a less authoritarian type of therapy than 
behavior therapy. Since dogmatism has been shown to correlate (r = • 71) quite 
strongly with authoritarianism (Kerlinger, 1966) it seems likely that a more 
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authoritarian type of ideology, such as behaviorism, may also be perceived as 
being a more dogmatic system. 
Ideology can be defined as the body of doctrine or tenets of social move-
ments, classes or groups. Schools of psychology have their own ideologies. 
These ideologies could be perceived as being dogmatic or less dogmatic and 
could be attractive to a person who is more or less dogmatic. Breger and 
McGaugh (1967) said that ". . . the field [ of psychology] is still characterized 
by 'schools'--groups who adhere to a particular set of ideas and techniques to 
th e exclusion of oth e rs. Thus, there are dogmatic psychoanalysts, Adlerians, 
Roge rians, and most recently, dogmatic behaviorists." 
In light of Rokeach' s findings with different religious and political 
groups one might ask "Are there different levels of dogmatism in the ideology 
of the different groups which attract equally dogmatic adherents ?" 
The intent of the present study is to determine if different le vels of 
sco res on the Dogmatism Scale Form E may have some relationship with a 
student's affinity for a particular theoretical orientation or school of psychology, 
namely Skinnerian Behaviorism vs. Rogers' client-centered approach. 
This writer has been unable to find any research which deals specifically 
with the quest ion of a subject's affinity for different schools of psychology as 
related to their degree of dogmatism. A question worth asking at this point is: 
Would a person who is highly dogmatic find Skinnerian concepts to be more 
attractiv e than someone who is less dogmatic? Also, would a highly dogmatic 
person find Skinn erian concepts mor e attractive than Rogerian concepts? 
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Rokeach (1960) attempted to show how different schools of psychology 
were related (conceptually) to his main distinctions of the open and closed 
systems. Of behaviorism Rokeach said, "Behaviorism emphasizes the impor-
tance of external reinforcements or rewards and punishments, as determinants 
of behavior. If man were completely closed in his belief system (dogmatic) he 
could be completely controlled and directed by such arbitrary reinforcements." 
He goes on to say "What does matter from our point of view is that they all 
seem to have as their model a man (also a rat or pigeon) completely closed in 
his belief system." 
Perhaps a dogmatic person would find such qualities as enumerated in 
the aforementioned description of behaviorism to be attractive because they are 
congruent with his attitudes and could be incorporated into his belief system. 
Clouser & Hjelle's findings (1970) tend to support Rokeach's hypothesis 
regarding behaviorism's emphasis on the external. In their study they corre-
lated subjects' scores on Rokeach Dogmatism scale with their scores on the 
Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control scale. The correlation yielded was 
. 24 (significant at an alpha level of . 01). In addition a test of significance of 
the difference between mean dogmatism scores for extreme externals and 
extreme internals showed a significant difference at the . 05 level. This data 
indicates that a person who was more dogmatic was also more externally 
oriented in terms of his Locus of Control. This data as well as Rokeach's 
hypothesis would imply that a dogmatic person may find Skinnerian concepts 
to be more attractive than a less dogmatic person as well as more attractive 
than Rogerian concepts. 
5 
Weiss (1973) found, in a comparison with doctoral level analytically-
oriented students, that behavior therapy students 'behaved more in the style of 
a "true-believer" (Hoffer). A true believer is a person who holds his beliefs to 
be true to the exclusion of all others; i.e., dogmatically. Weiss raised the 
question of whether this behavior was shaped (a process of selectively rein-
forcing appropriate responses yielding a desired behavior) by the students' 
department; or whether the students perceived the program as having a dogmatic 
quality and thus its inherent characteristics were compatible with the students' 
personalities. Proceeding on Weiss' later assumption perhaps the more 
dogmatic psychology graduate student would do better in the experimental-
behavioral department than in a counseling program with a more phenomeno-
logical bias. Saltzman (1967) attempted to see how student counselors varied 
on three Rogerian therapy main components (positive regard, empathy and 
congruence) relative to their scores on the dogmatism scale. He found that 
student counselors low in dogmatism were rated most positively on each of the 
three variables. This tends to indicate that a student low in dogmatism has 
better facility with Rogerian methods and this may indicate a possible prefer-
ence for the Rogerian concepts. 
By virtue of its professed lack of control and absence of any real 
theoreU cal superstructure Rogers' non-directive client-centered approach 
may attract less dogmatic adherents. Conversely, it appears that 
behaviorism with implied dependence on total control (by the awarding and 
withholding of reinforce rs) may attract more dogmatic adherents. 
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On the assumption that, conceptually, there may exist a relationship 
between level of dogmatism of Ss and attitudinal congruence with behaviorism or 
the Rogerian client-centered approach, two questions worth asking are, "Can 
this be demonstrated empirically?' and if so, "To what extent does this rela-
tionship exist?" 
In light of the high degree of transparency of Rokeach' s D scale when 
answered by psychologists, how can we assess the different levels of dogmatism 
of the adherents to behaviorism and the client-centered approach? One way to 
get at these attitudes unobtrusively is by use of selective retention as an indi-
cator of att itude. 
This writer has been unable to find any research comparing subjects' 
scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale-Form E and retention scores on the 
tenets of behaviorism and/or the Rogerian cli ent-centered approach. 
Purposes 
Therefore, the purpose of this study will be to inquire whether a person 
who is highly dogmatic will have better retention of Skinnerian concepts than the 
low dogmatic as well as better retention of Skinnerian concepts than of Rogerian 
concepts. It will also be the purpose of this study to inquire whether a low 
dogmatic person will recall more Rog-crian conc ept:::; than the high dogmatic 
person as well as better retention of Rogerian concepts than of Skinnerian 
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concepts. Finally, this study will attempt to ascertain if scores on the 
Dogmatism scale are significantly correlated with scores on the Skinner scale 
in a positive direction while being significantly correlated with scores on the 
Rogerian scale in a negative direction. 
Chapter II 
Review of Literature 
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This review is divided into 2 parts. The first deals with Skinnerian 
Behaviorism and Rogers' Client-Centered Approach. The second with the 
empirical measures utilized in this study. 
Skinnerian Behaviorism and Rogers' Client-Centered Approach 
Skinnerian Behaviorism and the Rogers' Client-Centered Approach are 
two schools of thought in psychology, each coming out of broader schools. 
Skinner's school of thought is subsumed under Behaviorism and Carl Rogers' 
approach is subsumed under phenomenology. These two positions seem to split, 
most basically, regarding the old philosophical argument regarding free will vs. 
determinism. Currently, this argument between the two schools in psychology 
is expressed in the following question: Is man free to control his own behavior 
through his subjective experience of himself in relation to his world, as Carl 
Rogers believes, or is man controlled by an external program of different 
reinforcement contingencies found in his external environment, as B. F. Skinner 
believes. Perhaps someone whose Locus of Control is external and is dogmatic 
would prefer Skinner's view of man to Rogers'. Conversely, someone with an 
internal locus of control and low dogmatism wruld prefer Rogers' view of man to 
Skinner's. Let us first look more closely at the two views of man as postulated 
by the behaviorists and by the Rogerian phenomenologists (the behavioral view 
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fits more neatly under the label behaviorist; while Rogers 1 view is less easily 
labeled. For our discussion we will use the terms behaviorism and the Rogers 1 
Client-Centered Approach). 
Behaviorism, as the scientific, experimentally based approach to man 
has tenets or dogmas which are empirically derived. Certainly, in the current 
phase of psychology 1 s evolution these are tenets which can be believed in with 
real conviction. It has been shown that a behavior performed and then rewarded 
or "reinforced" has a greater probability of occurrence while that behavior 
which is not reinforced and/or is punished has a decreasing probability of 
reoccuring (Sulzer & Mayer, 1972). With these two general principles of 
behavior and their variants it is possible to control animals, and to a lesser 
degree, human behavior. "While much progress has been made in this approach 
to behavior eontrol the techniques may be said to be still in the experimental 
stage. The effectiveness of the procedures in terms of the extent and duration 
of the chang-cs produced is not known" (Patterson, 19Gfi). However, rather than 
admit a real deficit in the technology, behaviorists tend to view this lack of 
knowledge as only an artifact of the state of the art rather than admitting any 
real limitations to the technology. This type of closed mindedness may attract 
dogmatic adherents. 
Dogmati sm , which correlates at. 71 with authoritarianism (Kerlingcr, 
J !Hifi) may well he a personalit y variable which is more predominantly found in 
th e behaviorists vis-a-vis the control the beh avioris t have over peo pl e in therapy 
and anima ls in the lab. Wolpe, a leading behavior therapist, illustrates this iss ue 
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of control quite succinctly in the following, "the most distinctive feature of 
hehavior therapy is in the command it gives to the therapist both in planning the 
r;enera l strategy of therapy and controlling its details as he goes along. When 
one type of maneuver fails to accomplish change, another is tried according to 
appropriate indications, each variation heing an application of an experimentally 
esta!J l i shed principle" (Wolpe, p. 9). Therapist control and little theoretical 
amhig-uity m:1.kc this sort of therapy a potentially :1.ttractive field for the dog-
matist. Wolpe goes on to say tha t, "an explicit assumption of the behavior 
therapist is that human hchavior is subject to causal determination no less than 
that of billiard balls or ocean currents" (Wolpe, p. 16). Perhaps its presump-
tion of an objective reality, which denies the view that "all science begins with 
the sensory experience of th e sc ientist" (Carkhuff, 1967} may make behaviorism 
ar. attractive ideology to dogmatic peopl e . 
Behaviorism's external and causa l deterministic view of man makes it 
a system which uses externally visihlc symptomolo1,.,ry very effectively in therapy. 
Behavior therapy has as a basic t enet, the view that symptoms are the causally 
determined expression of the problem. Once the appropriate contingencies are 
placed on the symptomatic behav ior the behavior will cease and the problem has 
thus been eradicated. Eysenck, a leading behavior therapist, states "Get rid of 
the symptom and you have eliminated the neurosis" (Eysenck, p. 9). Con-
sequently the responsibility for t~c improvement of the client is in the hands of 
the therapist as diagnostician, not the client. Again .Joseph Wolpe, " ... the 
behavior therapist schools the patient to realize that his unpleasant reactions are 
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due to emotional habits that he cannot help; that they have nothing to do with 
moral fiber or an unwillingness to get well" (Wolpe, p. 16). "One result of 
realizing that neurotic behavior is learned is to place the responsibility for the 
patient's recovery unequivocally in the hands of the therapist" (Wolpe, p. 20). 
Since dogmatism has been shown to correlate significantly with an external 
Locus of Control, behaviorism may be more appealing to the more dogmatic 
person. 
Rogers' Client-Centered Approach, as the name implies, leaves the 
responsibility to change squarely with the client. Fernbach (1973) reported 
that 143 students who viewed a film of Carl Rogers working with a client rated 
his approach as non-directive. It is safe to say that Carl Rogers' approach is 
considered by most people in the field of psychology as non-directive. Also in 
Fernbach's study (1973) a signifi cantly (alpha= . 01) larger number of non-
authoritarian subjects, vs. authoritarian subjects chose Rogers' as their pre-
ferred the mode of therapy as opposed to a directive type of therapy. Wallen 
(1968) also found non-dogmatic clients to prefer a non-directive approach. 
These studies lend conceptual support to the notion that Rogers' Client-
Centered Approach could be more attractive to low dogmatics than Skinner's 
behaviorism. In fact, the Rogers' Client-Centered Approach has very few 
dogma. Carl Rogers, the commonly acknowledged head of the Rogers' Client-
Centered Approach sets out the "necessary and sufficient conditions" for 
therapeutic personality change as follows: 1) two persons are in psychological 
contact, 2) the therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client, 
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3) the therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the client's internal 
frame of reference, and 4) endeavors to communicate this understanding to the 
client (Rogers, 1957). These four simple tenets of Rogers may well appeal to 
the low dogmatic person. Rogers' talks nothing about controlling or diagnosing 
the client. His intention unlike that espoused by Wolpe, is to leave the respon-
sibility for change with the client. 
While behaviorism's view of man is a model of man simply reacting to 
the controlling environmental stimuli, Rogers' model sees man as a being in the 
process of becoming. Rogers said in a debate with B. F. Skinner, 1956, that 
man is "a process of achieving worth and dignity through the development of his 
potentialities; the individual human being as a self-actualizing process, moving 
on to more challenging and enriching experiences, the process by which the 
individual creatively adapts to an ever new and changing world ... " (Rogers 
& Skinner, 1956). 
It seems to be that these two views of man offer two distinctly different 
types of dogma for the appraisal of people. It is hypothesized that a group of 
naive subjects scoring high on the dogmatism scale would prefer Skinner's view 
of man while the low dogmatic group would prefer Rogers. Let us now turn to 
the construct of dogmatism. 
The Construct of Dogmatism 
The question of the content of belief and/ or ideology and the structure 
of belief is an interesting one; that is, what a person believes as opposed to how 
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he believes it. Adorno and Frenkl-Brunswick (1950) attempted to delineate an 
authoritarian belief structure with the introduction of the California F Scale in 
1950. They found a significant correlation between measured authoritarianism 
and a right wing political orientation. In this case political orientation (belief 
content) was confounded with authoritarianism (belief structure). 
Dogmatism vs. Authoritarianism 
In 1956 Rokeach, M., presented his concept of Dogmatism as a gener-
alized theory of authoritarianism (Rokeach, 1956, 1960); as opposed to a specific 
or right wing authoritarianism a s measured by the California F Scale (Adorno, 
Frenkl-Brunswick, Sanford, 19GO). His Dogmatism Scale was designed to 
measure generalized authoritar ianism or dogmatism and has been utilized as a 
better indicator of generalized authori taria nism than the California F Scale 
(Plant, 1960; Hanson, 1968). 
For purposes of his research into dogmatism and the development of his 
scale, Rokeach separated the ideology or content of the belief system from the 
structural organization of the individual's belief system. He seems to have found 
a measure of how a person's belief-disbelief system is organized. He separated 
what a person believes (i.e. Communism or Conservatism) from how be believes 
it (dogmatically or less dogmatically). Rokeach (1954) defined dogmatism as 
"a) a relatively closed cognit ive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about 
reality, b) organized around a central set of beliefs about absolute authority 
which in turn c) provides a framework for intolerance towards others" (p. 195). 
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Dogmatism thus focuses on how a person believes rather than what he 
believes and is conceptualized as an openness or closedness of a person's be li ef 
system. However, despite Rokeach's claim of a content free measure of how a 
person believes, one group of people who hold a common set of ideological beliefs 
as compared to another different group of people who, in turn, hold another com -
mon set of beliefs have slightly different levels of mean dogmatism scores. 
Different groups of people who adhere to their own ideaological sets, have 
been shown to possess different mean dogmatism scores (Rokeach, 1960). It is 
assumed that these different groups have their own basic common ideology and gen-
erally speaking, their own common set of values. Rokeach's studied with different 
political and religious groups seem to off er a parallel to the two ideologies under 
study here: namely, Skinnerian behaviorism and Rogers' Client-Centered Approach. 
Rokeach (1960) compared subjects' identified as Catholics, Protestants 
and non-believers in terms of their group dogmatism levels. He found that 
Catholics were, as a group, most dogmatic (mean = 191. 1), Protestants next 
(mean = 180. 1), and non-believers last (mean = 175. 6). This data was obtained 
from subjects residing in the Midwestern United States. In order to determine 
if these scores vary between the same religious groups in different geographical 
areas Rokeach ran a similar study in New York City. In this study Rokcach added 
Jews to the comparison. The results are somewhat different with the New York 
City sample. In New York City the Catholics were still the most dogmatic 
(mean = 147 . 4), but the non -believers were only slightly less dogmatic (mean= 
p47. 2), than the Catholics. While both New York groups were found to be 
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significantly less dogmatic than their Michigan counterparts, the spread between 
Catholics and non-believers has decreased from nearly 20 points to . 2 points. 
The Protestants in New York were ranked third (mean = 139. 4) with the Jewish 
group least dogmatic (mean = 138. 3). However, the only difference that approaches 
statistical significance (p = . 10) was that between Catholic and Jewish groups. It 
also seems noteworthy that for both samples the overall results indicated that the 
Catholics scored relatively high on right opinionation, dogmatism F (California F) 
and ethnocentrism. The left oriented non-believ ers scored relatively high on left 
opinionation, total opinionation and dogmatism but they scored relatively low on 
the California F Scale and Ethnocentrism Scale. 
Along a similar sort of va lue and ideological orientation dimension, 
Rokeach (1950) looked at different English political groups. His subjects were 
English college students who identified themselves as Conservative, Liberal, 
Attleite Laborite, Bevanite Laborite and Communist. Rokeach found that these 
groups did have different dogmatism levels. The Communists were most dog-
matic (mean= 261. 6) followed in descending order by Conservatives (mean = 
258. 8), Bevanites (255. 2), Attleites (252. 7), and lastly, Liberal (242. 9). The 
Communists scored the highest of all groups on left opinionation, total opiniona-
tion and dogmatism while scoring lowest of all groups on the F Scale and the 
Ethnocentrism Scale. On dogmatism, the only statistically significant different 
groups were the Communists and Liberals at an alpha level of . 06. 
These studies are informative regarding different religious and ideologi-
cal groups. They point out clearly that while dogmatism is an individual cognitive 
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belief structure cutting across ideologies, it is in some ways content bound, 
That is, the content of the belief (Jew vs. Catholic, etc.) has some predictive-
ness in regards to dogmatism. Thus, while on an individual level we may find 
a relatively open-minded Catholic and a closed-minded Jew with equal dogmatism 
scores, we can infer from the data that generally a Catholic will probably be 
more dogmatic than a Jew and a Communist will probably be more dogmatic 
than a Liberal. In light of these sorts of discrepancies Hanson (1968) investi-
gated the notion that dogmatism deals solely with extremes of attitudes. His 
findings indicate that since conservatives were more dogmatic than Liberals 
that dogmatism was to some degree content bound and not simply a measure of 
extremes of attitudes. 
Thus, one might ask, "do different systems of belief have different levels 
of dogmatism, thus to some degree attracting similar minded adherents?" In 
his book, The Open and Closed Mind, Rokeach does indeed discuss ideologies in 
terms of their dogm a and the level of open-closedness which is a function of the 
number of dogma, It is also a function of how exclusionary these dogma are. 
Nature of Dogmatic Belief Systems 
In addition to Rokeach's work in the area of dogmatism and political 
affiliation, has been the research dealing with voting behavior and dogmatism. 
The two American political parties espouse different ideological points of view 
within the overall context of the American political system much the same as 
Rogers' Client-Centered Approach and Skinnerian Behaviorism do within the field 
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of psychology. Di Renzo's study found that dogmatic subjects preferred the 
Republican Party while the non-dogmatic subjects were reported to prefer the 
Democratic Party (Di Renzo, 1968), Di Renzo also found non-dogmatic scorers 
on Rokeach's dogmatism scale overwhelmingly chose Johnson (80%) while dog-
matic scorers chose Goldwater (58%). The conclusion is that "personality 
structure is more clearly related to concrete political ideology than to a general 
party preference" (Di Renzo, 1968). He explains this to be due to the somewhat 
amorphous quality of party positions versus the concrete ideological position of 
candidates. Rosen & Kemy (1972) attempted to replicate Di Renzo's study in 
the '70 Tennessee Senate race which pitted a clear liberal Democrat against a 
clearly conservative Republican. They did not obtain significant results and 
attributed this to political-social circumstances which were not the same as in 
the election studied by Di Renzo. 
Dogmatism has also been shown to be a significant variable which casts 
light on the different attitudes and value orientations held by people of high and 
low dogmatism. 
Kirtlay and Harkness (1969) found that dogmatism was positively related 
to conservatism and rejection of minorities and groups associated with uncon-
ventionality and social change. They reported the following noteworthy corre-
lations which were derived from scores on the Rokeach D Scale and the Bogardus 
Social Distance Scale (a measure of manifest prejudice): art groups r = • 33, 
scientists r =. 26, left-oriented political groups r = • 44. These results tend to 
indicate a preference or affinity between dogmatism and authoritarianism and 
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rightist political ideology. It also tends to indicate that the more dogmatic a 
person is the more likelihood there is that he has more conventional and more 
traditional attitudes. 
In terms of their view of the dogmatic person's affinity for the status 
quo, Rosenman (1967) measured high and low dogmatics attitudes towards the 
movie Dr. Strangelove, a film that flaunted our traditional American social 
values. Rosenman reported that persons scoring high on dogmatism were sig-
nificantly less tolerant of the film than low dogmatics. In a similarly oriented 
study Kilpatrick et al. (1968) found highly dogmatic males had more conserva-
tive attitudes toward sex than did low dogmatic males while highly dogmatic 
females and low dogmatic females held equally conservative sexual attitudes. 
In another study Mikol (1960) found that high dogmatics tended to gravitate 
toward the traditional and conventional in music. Finally, Lorentz (1972) 
observed that a socially non-acceptable drug, marijuana was viewed with more 
acceptance by low dogmatics than high dogmatics. These studies tend to illus-
trate the interplay between a person's attitudes and their cognitive belief struc-
ture, or, more specially, a person's dogmatism level. A person who is high 
dogmatic and another who is low dogmatic may quite clearly have different 
attitudes, value orientations and responses towards a person, topic or ideology. 
Clearly, they may respond differentially toward the two different schools of 
psychology under investigation herein which take different views on the control 
of man and his behavior. 
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The control or non-control of a client in therapy and/or counseling by 
the therapist is a variable which can be used to help discriminate between 
different forms of treatment. It is said in this regard that a treatment is either 
directive (controlling) or non-directive (non-controlling). Since authoritarianism 
correlated (r = • 71) (Kerlinger, 1966), quite strongly with dogmatism it has been 
the interest of much research to ascertain the relationship between a client's 
level of authoritarianism and/or dogmatism and his choice or preference of 
therapist and the therapeutic approach utilized. Secondly, in this regard, an 
aspect of dogmatism which appeared theoretically similar to an external orienta-
tion in terms of Locus of Control is the dogmatic person's reliance on arbitrary 
reinforcements derived from an external authority (Rokeach, 1960). Therefore, 
there existed good conceptual support for Clouser and Hjelle' s (1970) investiga-
tion. They found a correlation of r = • 24 between external Locus of Control and 
dogmatism and a significant difference between mean dogmatism scores for 
extreme internals and mean dogmatism scores for extreme externals. Both of 
these studies imply that the high dogmatic and high authoritarian with their 
likelihood of an external Locus of Control would, conceptually, tend to prefer a 
directive, externally (therapist) controlling form of treatment. Conversely, we 
would expect the low dogmatic, low authoritarian to prefer a non-directive, non-
therapist-controlled treatment. The relevant data tended to support this 
hypothesis. Wallen (1968) found that relatively closed-minded subjects expressed 
a significantly greater preference for a counselor who was directive, while the 
relatively open-minded subjects expressed a greater preference for a counselor 
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who was non-directive. An interesting study by Fernbach (1973) attempted to 
determine high and low authoritarian's preference for a directive or non-directive 
therapist. He had 147 students rate a film presentation by Albert Ellis, Fritz 
Perls, and Carl Rogers, in terms of their directiveness. Ellis was rated as 
most directive and Carl Rogers as the most non-directive. Fernbach then showed 
the Ellis and Rogers segments to two equal sized groups of high and low authori-
tarians. He found that a significant number of the high authoritarians preferred 
Ellis to Rogers while the low authoritarians significantly preferred Rogers to 
Ellis. Perhaps had Fernbach utilized a Skinnerian therapist instead of Ellis as 
the directive therapist we would have had a similar sort of choice made regarding 
the choice of therapist. Jacobsen (1970) showed that subjects preferring behavior 
therapy were on the average more authoritarian. 
What would be the likelihood of a counselor therapist preferring and 
using the directive vs. non-directive therapy as his method of choice vis-a-vis 
his own dogmatism or lack of it? Kemp (1962) found that in a hypothetical 
(classroom) counseling situation both high and low dogmatic student-counselors 
were equally capable of assuming the non-directive stance. However, in the 
actual counseling situation the group low in dogmatism didn't change significantly 
in the character of their responses from their non-directive responses given in 
the hypothetical situation, whereas the high dogmatics did change the character 
of their responses. The direction of the change was towards fewer non-directive, 
supportive and understanding statements and towards more evaluative, directive, 
interpretive, probing and diagnostic responses. This study indicates that a 
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more dogmatic person would not only prefer a directive approach for his type of 
therapy used but would probably work better with it as well. Would a student 
therapist learn the behavioral, directive approach more easily than an open 
non-directive approach depending on, his level of authoritarianism and / or dog-
matism? Niel (1958) found that with psychiatry interns higher F scale scores 
resulted in greater difficulty in learning ambiguous material, that which involved 
humanitarian philosophy and understanding people (presumably an internal frame 
of reference). No such interference was found on tests of a more factual nature. 
Weiss (1973) compared doctoral students of behavior therapy with stu-
dents of analytic therapy and concluded that the "student behavior therapist 
seem ed far more self-confident and secure, sometimes to the point of being 
arrogant. Behavior therapists behaved more in the style of Eric Hoffer' s true 
believer." Weiss questioned whether this was a function of the departments the 
students were in (i.e., shaping the student) or whether the prospective student's 
selection of a program hinged upon the programs' compatability with the student's 
personality configuration. Harper (1959) stated, "Closed minds are equally 
evident in fanatics of other persuasions. The psychoanalytic-hating Salter, the 
Freud-biting Horney, the Freud-repressing Sullivan, the Freud-rejecting Adler 
& Jung (and those who orthodoxly follow these and other therapeutic messiahs) 
show an unwillingness to listen objectively and to consider the possible merit of 
opposing positions. Because of their permissive exterior such dogmatism is, 
though present, less evident in the Rogerians (p. 95)." Harper concluded that 
we need more eclecticism and synthesis and that future progress is blocked by 
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clinging to "psychotherapeutic religions." He indicates also that dogmatic 
schools of psychotherapy were necessary historically to insure survival of the 
school and to help change the professional and public view of itself. (This is 
consistent with Rokeach's view of the role of dogmatism played with religions. 
He postulated that as a threat to a religion increased so too its dogmatic quality, 
and when the threat subsided so too its dogmatic quality). Perhaps this is the 
case historically, with Skinnerian Behaviorism and the Rogers' Client-Centered 
Approach. It seems that behaviorism, with its reliance on the external control 
of man (and client) may be an ideology that is more congruent with the dogmatic 
person's belief system than the Rogers' Client-Centered Approach which as the 
name implies leaves the responsibility and control within the self of the client 
and generally to man himself as a self-initiating being. 
There seems then, to be several reasons to assume that students who 
choose the behavioristic approach may be more dogmatic as a group than those 
who are interested in studying client-centered therapy. 
Empirical Measures Utilized 
Dogmatism Scale 
Let us now turn first to the Dogmatism Scale. Rokeach's primary 
purpose is to measure individua l differences in openness or closedness of belief 
systems. Rokeach's items in the instrument were included on face validity. 
The Dogmatism Scale went through five revisions, and the final scale, Form E, 
contains the best forty items (as determined by item analysis) from the sixty-six 
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item Form D. Most all of the items on the scale were constructed by Rokeach. 
Those that were not are: item 21 from Hoffer (1951); 14 and 21 from Breger 
(1952), 22, 23, 27, 31, 33 and 34 from MMPI (Hathaway and McKinley, 1943). 
Ss agreement with the item is scored as closed, disagreement is scored as 
open. The final corrected and revised form, Form E, has reliability coefficients 
ranging from . 68 to • 93 for different groups (Rokeach, 1960). 
Rokeach's D Scale is a scale "designed to measure individual differences 
in the extent to which belief systems are open or closed" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 19). 
The California F Scale of Adorno et al. has been demonstrated to be a measure 
of right-wing authoritarianism while Rokeachs' Dogmatism Scale is a measure 
of general authoritarianism (Ker li nger and Rokeach, 1960; Kerlinger, 1966, 
Plant, 1960). 
Vacchiano, Strauss & Hochman (1969) reviewed all the relevant research 
on Rokeach' s scale and concluded "the findings generally support the validity of 
Rokeach's concepts, particularly as a generalized theory of authoritarianism." 
Selective Recall 
In 1902, Stern was the pioneer in selective recall who first broke from 
the classical tradition of Ebbinghaus by looking at the problem of memory distor-
tion as a function of personal attitudes and beliefs. He found that one's attitudes 
will affect how one remembers material related to the attitude. His early work 
has been studied repeatedly through the years. Bartlett (1932) stated, "remem-
bering is an imaginative reconstruction or construction built out of the relation 
of our attitude toward a whole active mass of organized past reactions or 
experiences" (Seelman, 1940). 
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Memory distortion as a function of personal attitude has been confirmed 
repeatedly through the years (Watson & Hartman, 1939; Levine & Murphy, 1943; 
Taft, 1954; Feather, 1969; Wickley, 1970). 
This phenomenon has been utilized with political orientation and recall. 
Kitano (1970) found when radicals and conservatives were asked to recall state-
ments concerning political views of the Japanese Government that the radical 
group showed a higher ratio of recollection of the radical statements and con-
servative group of the conservative statements; that is, the statements which 
were consistent with the social attitudes of the Ss are recalled in a higher ratio 
while those which were incompat ible were more apt to be forgotten. It seems 
th a t perhaps we could infer a person' s political ideological adherence and / or 
attraction to that ideology by looking at the selective recall of political items. 
So too with attraction to psychological ideologies. 
It has been shown that people (Ss) "under controlled conditions were able 
to report more arguments that supported their attitude toward a given issue than 
arguments that did not support their attitude " (Feather, 1969). The number of 
consistent and inconsistent arguments reported didn't, however, depend upon 
the subjects degree of dogmatism while there was a difference between high and 
low dogmatics in terms of what was recalled vis-a-vis the different content of 
arguments. That is, the two groups recalled differently arguments pro and con 
on the Viet Nam War issue (Feather, 1969a, b). These results were replicated 
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in a similar study by Gormley & Close (1969). Kleck and Wheaton (1967) found 
that closed-minded Ss do recall less from the dissonant article than do the 
open-minded subjects supporting the use of selective recall as was found in the 
above studies. 
Pryon and Kafer (1967) found that on a recall task involving recall of 
nonsense sentences, low dogmatics recalled significantly more items than high 
dogmatics. However, no data involving recall of meaningful material was found 
by this writer. 
Dogmatism and Response Set 
In 1961, Erlich found that achievement scores in an introductory sociol-
ogy course were negatively correlated with dogmatism. However, in analyzing 
psychology courses achievement, neither Christensen (1967) nor Costen (1965) 
found any significant correlation between dogmatism scores and achievement 
scores. 
A possible confounding variable with recall is I. Q. and memory differ-
ences. However, neither Erlich (1955) nor Kleck & Wheaton (1967) found any 
difference in recall level between high and low dogmatic subjects as a function 
of I. Q. levels. Kleck & Wheaton (1967) also found that the decreased recall of 
a dissonant article by high dogmatics was not a function of memory differences. 
It may be that subjects with different levels of dogmatism might have a 
response set with different types of questions (i.e. , true - false, etc. ) . However, 
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Christensen (1967) found no significant correlation between dogmatism scores 
when correlated with either an essay or multiple choice score, and White and 
Alter (1967) found no significant correlation between dogmatism scores and 
sc ores on a true-false test and multiple choice test. It appears from the above 
research that a dogmatic subject's response set to different types of questions 
(i.e., true-false, essay, multiple choice, etc.) and I. Q. levels are not con-
founding variables. 
Becker (1967) found that when Ss' scores on Rokeach's D Scale were 
paired with another of Ss' scores on another variable (yielding a bivariate 
frequency distribution) that scores on D Scale were curvilinear. This necessi-
tate s using a high medium and low trichotomy in analyzing the Ss scores, for 
to exclude the middle group would yield distorted data. 
In conclusion, it is expected that by looking at a person's selective 
re call of certain relevant psychologic al items we can infer his adherence and / or 
attraction to that psychological ideology. We could relate this retention of 
psychological items to a subject s ' level of dogmatism. It may be that behaviorism, 
the rigorously scientific field of psychology, would be more attractive to more 
closed minded individuals, or it may not. Conversely, the Client-Centered 
Approach, with its dedication to the client's self-control of himself and lack of 
sc ientific rigor may attract more open minded people or it may not. These issues 
r a ised here have not been answe r ed by the research to date. 
Chapter ill 
Purposes and Objectives 
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For purposes of the present study it is assumed that different theoretical 
orientations, i.e., schools of psychology have different tenets and beliefs. It is 
also postulated that students who become adherents (to a greater or lesser degree) 
of different schools probably find certain aspects of the school attractive and 
other aspects less attractive. In other words, a given school of thought may be 
attractive for people who are rel atively dogmatic in their own belief system. 
Conversely, another given school of thought may be attractive for people who are 
relatively non-dogmatic in their own belief system. 
It will be the objective of this study to determine if high dogmatic sub-
jects score higher on the Skinner retention scale than low dogmatic subjects . It 
will also be the objective of this study to determine if low dogmatic subjects 
score higher on the Rogers retention scale than the high dogmatic subjects. 
Another objective is to determine if Ss in the highly dogmatic group will have 
higher mean retention scores on the Skinner scale than on Rogers scale. It 
will also be the objective of this study to determine if Ss in the low dogmatic 
group will have higher mean retention scores on the Rogers scale than on the 
Skinner scale. The final objecti ve will be to do separate Pearson product-
moment correlations to determine the degree of common variance between 
dogmatism scores and retention scores on the Skinner and Rogers scales. 
Hypotheses formulated on the basis of the preceding objectives are: 
(1) On the combined Skinner retention scale, there is no significant 
difference between high, medium and low dogmatism groups. 
(2) On the combined Rogers retention scale, there is no significant 
difference between high, medium and low dogmatism groups. 
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(3) In the high dogmatism group, there is no significant difference 
between mean retention scores for the combined Skinner scale and the combined 
Rogers scale. 
(4) In the low dogmatism group, there is no significant difference 
between mean retention scores for the combined Skinner scale and the combined 
Rogers scale. 
(5) In the low dogmatism group, there is no significant difference 
between retention scores on the second retention testing occasion for the Skinner 
scale and the Rogers scale. 
(6) In the low dogmatism group, there is no significant difference 
between retention scores on the second retention testing occasion on the Skinner 
scale and the Rogers scale. 
(7) Scores on the Dogmatism Scale are significantly correlated with 
scores on the Skinner scale in a positive direction while being significantly 
correlated with scores on the Rogerian scale in a negative direction. 
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Chapter IV 
Procedures 
Population and Sample 
Population 
The population utilized in this study was comprised of students enrolled 
in Psychology 101, Introduction to Psychology, during Winter & Spring Quarters, 
1974. The subjects ranged in age from 18-21 years old. 
In order to have subjects who had completed both the Skinner and Rogers 
retention scales and the dogmatism scale those subjects who had not completed 
all three scales were dropped from the study. 
Sample 
The total N for this study was originally 96. However, since 54 of 
these subjects were absent from the Psychology 101 class during one or another 
testing occasion, they were dropped from study. This was intended to yield true 
data for all subjects utilized. Thus the total N for all 3 groups was 42. Subjects 
were separated into groups by the method utilized by Rokeach. This method is 
one which uses relative ranks of subjects scores. For example , the group known 
as high dogmatism is high relative to the medium and low groups . Subjects were 
ranked by the score they received on the Dogmatic Scale-Form E and comparisons 
were made between the highest 1/ 3, the middle 1/3, and the lowest 1/3. Students 
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in the highest 1/3 of the ranked scores on the Dogmatism Scale-Form E were 
placed in one group and were known as the high dogmatic group with an N of 12; 
students who scored in the middle 1/3 of the ranked scores on the Dogmatism 
scale-Form E comprised that group designated as the moderate dogmatism 
group with an N of 20; students who scored in the lowest 1/3 of the ranked scores 
on the Dogmatism Scale- Form E comprised that group known as the low dog-
matism group with an N of 10. These 3 groups served as the subjects for the 
study. 
Materials 
Three scales were emp loyed in this study. One was the Rokeach Dog-
matism Scale-Form E (Rokeach, 1960). The second and third scales were 
retention tests on statements made by Skinner & Rogers at the outset of their 
tape recorded debate at the Univ e rsity of Wisconsin, 1962, entitled "Some Issues 
Concerning the Control of Human Behavior" (see AppendiceR C & D). 
The instructions for the Dogmatism Scale-Form E (see Appendix A) 
were as follows: 
The following is a study of what the general public thinks and 
feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The 
best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have 
tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find 
yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing 
just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; 
whether you agree or di sagree with any statement, you can be sure 
that many people feel the same as you do. 
Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you 
agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one. 
Write +l: I AGREE A LITTLE +1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
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+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE +2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE 
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH 
The scale yields a total score for each subject. This is computed by 
adding a constant of +4 to each of the items and then totaling all 40 obtained 
scores. 
The Skinner and Rogers scales (see Appendix B) were comprised of 15 
items each. These were direct quotes from the talks of Skinner and Rogers as 
read to the Ss by a member of the Utah State University Speech Department. 
The questions were an assortment of multiple choice and True-False questions. 
The subjects were instructed as follows regarding the Rogers and Skinner scales: 
This test does not in any way count toward your grade in this class. 
This is simply a recognition or memory test for use in my study. Please 
answer the questions by making the correct answer as you remember it. 
Method 
The method was exactly the same (except for presentation order of the 
Rogers & Skinner talks) for both Psychology 101 classes (Winter Quarter, 1974, 
& Spring Quarter, 1974), Both classes were taught by the same instructor who 
taught the class with an eclectic approach to the subject matter. 
For both groups the data was collected early in the quarter before the 
students were lectured to on the teachings of either Skinner or Rogers. It was 
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hoped that this would allow us to use Ss who were naive. Their naivete as to 
the teaching of Skinner and Rogers was also insured to some degree by the fact 
that the majority of students in Psychology 101 are in their freshman year and 
hadn't yet been well schooled in Skinnerian and Rogerian concepts. 
Subjects were first administered Rokeach' s Dogmatism Scale- Form E. 
One week later, a member of the Speech Department read to the class the trans-
cribed statements of Skinner & Rogers (see Appendices C and D). The purpose 
of having one person read the sta te:r:ients was to provide a control for the differ-
ing levels of charisma and appeal found in the voices of Skinner & Rogers. In 
the Winter Quarter Class the ord e r in which the statements were read was 
Rogers first and immediately the r eafter Skinner's statement was read. Imme-
diately after the transcribed statements were read the Skinner and Rogers scales 
were passed out to the class. In order to allow for selective retention the recall 
task was again administered, in its exact same form, one week after the first 
administration. The two scores derived from the administration were averaged 
yielding a mean score for each subject on the Rogers & Skinner scales. 
The same procedure wa s repeated with the Spring Quarter Psychology 101 
class. The only procedural change difference was that the order of presentation 
of the two statements was reversed. That is, in the Winter Quarter reading of 
the transcripts, Rogers' statement was read first followed immediately by Skinner's 
statement. This was reversed for the Spring Quarter class, with Skinner being 
read first followed by Rogers. The 2 groups of data obtained from the 2 classes 
were then grouped together and treated as one group thus negating the order of 
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presentation effect as a confounding variable. There were 42 Ss involved in the 
study. 
Statistical Analysis 
To test for the significance of the difference between the mean scores 
on the Rogers & Skinner scales of the high, medium and low dogmatic groups 
for the hypotheses, six separate one-way analyses of variance were used; one 
for each scale (Guilford, 1956, p. 258). To test the relationship between vari-
ables involved in the study, the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient 
was used (Guilford, 1956, p. 285). 
Scoring of the Instrument 
The protocols were all scored by the investigator. The Rokeach Dog-
matism Scale-Form E was scored first by hand and final computations were done 
on a Commodore-AL 1000 Calculator. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1: (on the combined Skinner scale there is no significant 
different between high, medium and low dogmatism groups) a one-way analysis 
of variance was computed. Table 1 summarizes the results of this analysis, 
There was no significant difference found in this data, 
Source 
Total 
Table 1 
One-way Analysis of Variance with Dogmatism as the Independent 
Variable and Retention Scores on the Skinner Scale as the 
Dependent Variable 
Degrees of Freedom Mean Squares F 
41 
Treatment 2 3.429 .14 
Error 39 24.34 
Degrees of Freedom cc: 2/ 39 Fat. 05 ~· 3 . 23 Fat. 01 = 5.18. 
Hypothesis 2: (on the combined Rogers scale there is no significant 
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difference between high, medium and low dogmatism groups) a one-way analysis 
of variance was computed. Table 2 summarizes the results of this analysis. 
Source 
Total 
Table 2 
One-way Analysis of Variance with Dogmatism as the Independent 
Variable and Retention Scores on the Rogers Scale as the 
Dependent Variable 
Degrees of F r eedom Mean Squares F 
41 
Treatment 2 18. 479 1. 085 
Error 39 17.026 
Degrees of Freedom = 2/39 Fat. 05 = 3. 23 Fat. 01 = 5.18. 
There was no significant difference found in this data. 
Hypothesis 3: (in the high dogmatism group there is no significant 
difference between mean retention scores on the combined Skinner scale and 
the combined Rogers scale) a one-way analysis of variance was computed. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of this analysis. 
Source 
Total 
Table 3 
One-way Analysis of Variance with High Dogmatism Scores as the 
Independent Variable and Mean Retention Scores on the Rogers 
& Skinner Scales as the Dependent Variable 
Degrees of Freedom Mean Squares F 
23 
Treatment 1 22.04 1. 06 
Error 22 20.70 
Degrees of Freedom == 1/ 22 F at . 05 =- 4. 35 at . 01 == 8. 10. 
There was no significan t difference found in this data. 
Hypothesis 4: (in the low dogmatism group, there is no significant 
35 
difference between mean retention scores for the combined Skinner scale and the 
combined Rogers scale) a one-way analysis of variance was computed. Table 4 
summarizes the results of this analysis. 
There was no significan t difference found in this data. 
Source 
Total 
Table 4 
One-way Analysis of Variance with Low Dogmatism Scores as the 
Independent Variable and Mean Retention Scores on the Rogers 
& Skinner Scales as the Dependent Variable 
Degrees of Freedom Mean Squares F 
19 
Treatment 1 . 05 . 0026 
Error 18 19.1 
Degrees of Freedom = 1/18 F at . 05 = 4. 45 F at . 01 = 8. 40. 
Hypothesis 5: (in the high dogmatism group, there is no significant 
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difference between retention scores on the second testing occasion on the Skinner 
scale and the Rogers scale) a one-way analysis of variance was computed. 
Table 5 summarizes the results of this analysis. 
Source 
Total 
Table 5 
One-way Analysis with High Dogmatism Scores as the Independent 
Variable and Rete ntion Scores on the Second Testing 
Occasion on the Skinner Scale and the Rogers Scales 
as the Dependent Variable 
Degrees of Fr eedom Mean Squares F 
23 
Treatment 1 6.000 . 838 
Error 22 7.151 
Degrees of Freedom = 1/22 F at . 05 = 4. 35 F at . 01 = 8. 10. 
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There was no significant difference found in this data. 
Hypothesis 6: (in the low dogmatism group, there is no significant 
difference between retention scores on the second retention testing occasion on 
the Skinner scale and the Rogers scale) a one-way analysis of variance was com-
puted. Table 6 summarizes the results of this analysis. 
Source 
Total 
Table 6 
One-way Analysis of Variance with Low Dogmatism Scores as the 
Independent Variable and the Retention Scores on the Second 
Testing Occasion on the Skinner Scale and Rogers Scale 
as the Dependent Variable 
Degrees of Freedom Mean Squares F 
19 
Treatment 1 .45 • 093 
Error 18 . 480 
Degrees of Freedom = 1/18 Fat . 05 = 4. 45 F at . 01 = 8. 40. 
There was no significant difference found in this data. 
Hypothesis 7: (scores on the Dogmatism Scale are significantly corre-
lated with scores on the Skinner scale in a positive direction while being sig-
nificantly correlated with scores on the Rogerian scale in a negative direction) 
a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed between dog-
matism scores and the Rogers & Skinner scales. (For purposes of a more in-
depth analysis the results of the two scales were broken down into six variables. 
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They are as follows: variable 1) subjects' scores on first testing on Skinner 
scale; variable 2) scores on first testing on Rogers scale; variable 3) scores on 
second testing on Skinner scale; variable 4) second testing on Rogers scale; 
variable 5) total scores from variables 1 and 3; variable 6) total scores on 
variables 2 and 4). 
These results are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Inter-correlations 
Scor es on Skinner and Rogers Scales 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dogmatism -.16 -.18 -. 15 -. 19 -.15 -.24 
Degrees of Freedom - 40, r at . 05 = • 304, rat . 01 = • 393, r at . 10 = 2. 57. 
The results of the above table indicate no significant relationships 
existing between the scores on the dogmatism scale and the scores derived from 
the two recall tests of the Skinnerian and Rogerian concepts. 
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Chapter V 
Discussion 
The findings of this study indicate that there exists no significant 
difference between those subjects who are highly dogmatic, moderately dog-
matic and non-dogmatic in their retention of Skinnerian or Rogerian concepts. 
Utilizing the concept of selective retention as a predictor of attitude, neither of 
the three dogmatic groups had any significantly different level of positive atti-
tude toward Skinner's or Rogers' concepts. Thus, it appears that the data 
obtained herein would tend to dispute any a priori attitude affinity towards 
Rogerian or Skinnerian concepts vis-a-vis different levels of dogmatism or 
closed mindedness. 
The question raised by Weiss (1973) in his study was essentially, why 
did behavior therapy students appear to behave more like "true believers" than 
analytic students. Weiss speculated that the behavior therapy students were 
either selectively reinforced by their professors for their dogmatic verbal state-
ments (in which case the students initial levels of dogmatism varied prior to 
their being shaped up) or the students entered into the behavior therapy program 
precisely because they perceived it as heing a dogmatic school and this was con-
gruent with their high levels of dogmatism. 
Conceptually, it would follow that the opposite would be true of the 
Rogerian therapy students. That is, they would behave as a "non-true believer." 
This appears to be so by virtue of the quality of the Rogerian School's non-
directive approach as opposed to the directive approach used in behavior 
therapy. 
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Weiss' question was partially addressed by this investigation. The 
question was reformulated as follows: Would the highly dogmatic group remem-
ber Skinner significantly more than the medium group and low group ? The 
answer was clearly no. The con verse, in regard to Rogers, was also answered 
no. A highly dogmatic person, thus, has no more a priori affinity for Skinner 
than a moderate dogmatist and the non-dog matist. 
It would appear by extending the point that the so-called "dogmatic 
behaviorist" is perhaps an historical artifact due to the fact that behaviorism is 
a relatively new school and is in its dogmatic phase and therefore people are 
more frequently exposed to a dogmatic behaviorist in their schooling. Rokeach 
(1960, p. 68) reported that this phenomenon has been observed in new religious 
sects. Dogmatism is essentially a self-preservation tactic which the new sect 
uses to protect its dogmas from outside attacks and threats in the form of 
challenges to its dogmas as well as a motivating force in spreading the new 
"gospel." We have seen this happen repeatedly and as the sect or faith ages it 
becomes less dogmatic. (This can be observed in Catholicism most explicitly. ) 
So too, in psychology's history. Observe Freudian Psychoanalysis' evolution. 
Initially, it was quite dogmatic. Eventually the dogmatic quality gave way 
before the dialectic processes of history and soon we observed the emergence 
of the so-called New Freudians. Today the "school" of Freudianism is not 
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especially dogmatic although it is not unusual to meet a dogmatic Freudian. 
It would be my bias that Weiss' study showed the behavior students to 
behave as "true believers" because he used advanced doctoral students that were 
shaped up to be "behaviorists" by their undergraduate programs and to a greater 
degree by their graduate programs. Consequently, they chose the behavioral 
graduate program because of some prior disposition as well as being shaped up 
by their departments. 
Another question raised in this paper was in regard to Jacobson's (1970) 
study and the Clous er and Jhelle study. Jacobsen found, it will be remembered, 
that Ss who chose behavior therapy "were on the average more dependent, more 
authoritarian, and more externally oriented than Ss choosing analytically 
oriented therapy." Clouser & Hjelle (1970) found that an external control orienta-
tion, as measured by the Rotter Internal-External Scale (1966), varies positively 
(r ,--· . 24 sig. at = • 05) with scores on Rokeach' s D Scale. Thus, the present 
study postulated that perhaps ha d dogmatism been a variable used by ,Jacobsen 
it too would have been associated with those choosing behavior therapy. The 
present study essentially shed no light on this postulation. It can only be said 
regarding the obtained data herein that Ss who were high in dogmatism had 
essentially the same degree of recall of both Skinner and Rogers statements. 
The data indicates that a high dogmatic person has no greater attitude congruence 
with Skinner's position than he may have with Rogers' position. 
Looking at the stereotypes from the other side of the issue, this 
present study showed no significant difference within the low dogmatism groups 
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in terms of their mean retention scores on the Skinner and Rogers scale. 
Therefore, on the assumption that selective recall is an indicator of attitude, 
Rogers' view of man as self-determined and free and Rogers' attitude of non-
control and non-direction of clients were not necessarily more appealing to the 
low dogmatic group than were Skinners', "man's behavior is determined," 
views. Perhaps with different groups such as advanced psychology students the 
attitudes may have had more time to form and this may be the time at which a 
more or less dogmatic flavor would be found in the Ss. However, naive Ss 
attitudes towards Skinner & Rogers were essentially the same at the different 
levels of dogmatism. 
The final query of this study was the amount of common variance 
between levels of dogmatism and the different levels of retention scores on the 
Skinner & Rogers scales. As was found there existed a negative relationship 
between levels of dogmatism and all six sub-variables within the two retention 
scales. However, while these correlations were negative, there wasn't any 
strong relationships found. It would seem to be indicated in the correlational 
matrix, to a small degree, that as the Ss score on the D scale increased 
the retention scores tended to decrease and vice-versa. However, with no 
correlation higher than -. 23 this can only be said with the greatest caution 
since a graphic depiction of the bivariate distribution indicates a great deal of 
spread around the line of best fit. 
It would appear that to categorize all psychologists who more or less 
identify with the principles of one "school" in psychology as dogmatic is a 
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generalization which simply doesn't hold up. It seems reasonable to suspect 
that dogmatism is a personality variable which is probably normally distributed, 
cutting across schools of psychology. This would explain the dogmatic behaviorist 
and the dogmatic Rogerian and the non-dogmatic behaviorist and the non-dogmatic 
Rogerian. It also would be a reason for a lack of significant difference found 
here between groups. While the small N of each group may have also been a 
contributory factor in the lack of a significant difference it seems more likely to 
be a function of the fact that dogmatic and non-dogmatic people can be found in 
any group. This may well be highlighted in this study by the fact that naive 
subjects may not be grouped by attitude, as yet, regarding pro-Skinner or anti-
Skinner sentiments. 
What our field needs is more eclecticism and synthesis of our schools. 
Perhaps one day we will be able to view the work of the behaviorist as explaining 
one piece of the puzzle, Rogerians another piece and, say physiological psychology, 
another piece. When we begin looking more at the similarities within the different 
schools and not until then can we end the senseless in-fighting which separates our 
field into different camps. After all, we psychologists are all in the field which, 
directly or indirectly, hopes to lead man and society to a higher level of con-
sciousness and self-awareness and a better life for all. 
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Delimitations 
The Instrument 
It may seem that there exists a confounding variable in the two scales 
of retention of Skinnerian and Rogerian concepts in that there is a differential 
degree of difficulty in recalling the item. This differential difficulty would, to 
be confounding, be greater for one scale (for example, Skinners) than for the 
other (for example, Rogers). However, the correlation between the Skinner & 
Rogers scales was . 46. It seems that this correlation indicates that their com-
mon variance is close enough to persuade us that the two scales are of relatively 
equal difficulty while retaining a good amount of variance explained by other 
variables. It was hoped that dogmatism could be one of those other variables 
and that these scales could in some way help discriminate at different dogmatism 
levels. 
Sample 
The size of the subject sample does seem to be of a small enough 
size for the low dogmatism group (N cc- 10) that an adequate degree of generaliza-
bility may be questionable. The comparisons yielded between the high dogmatism 
group (N ~ 12) and the low dogmatism group may not have yielded statistically 
significant data due to a constricted sample size. A larger sample size of, for 
example, N = 100, may well have yielded the statistical difference between 
groups that the study hoped to find. 
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Implications for Further Research 
1. Using naive subjects a study should be run to determine change of 
attitude (both in terms of degree and direction of change) toward Skinner & Rogers 
using a pretest-post test design. 
2. The study could be replicated using graduate students in the 
behavioral and counseling programs. This would be useful in assessing the 
differing levels of dogmatism in subjects whose attitudes and biases had already 
had sufficient time to form. 
3. There is much talk of Rogerians and Skinnerians. A scale should 
be devised to assess the degree of affinity for the two positions so as to assist 
the researchers in this area when he is using "Rogerians" and "Skinnerians" as 
his subjects. 
4. Replicate this study except this time have longer time intervals 
between the administration of the recall task such as one month, three months, 
and six months. 
5. Use other relevant variables of the subjects personality, such as 
I. Q. scores or G. P.A., as covariates with dogmatism and see if there is any 
significant relationship between these variables by means of an analysis of 
covariance. 
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Appendix A: Opinion Questionnaire 
The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels 
about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to 
each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many 
different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly 
with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and 
perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any state-
ment, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do. 
Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you 
agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one. 
Write +l, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each 
case: 
+1: I AGREE A LITTLE -1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE 
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH 
1. The United States and Russian have just about nothing in common. 
----
2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest 
---- form of democracy is a government run by those who are most 
intelligent. 
____ 3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, 
it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain 
political groups. 
4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaint-
----
ance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes. 
5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. 
----
6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place. 
----
7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. 
----
8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve 
----
my personal problems. 
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9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future. 
----
10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in. 
----
11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop. 
----
12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several 
---- times to make sure I am being understood. 
13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I 
---- am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying. 
14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward. 
----
15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition 
---- is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or 
Shakespeare. 
16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something 
---- important. 
17. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the 
----
world. 
18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful 
----
of really great thinkers. 
19. There are a numb e r of people I have come to hate because of the 
---- things they stand for. 
____ 20, A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really 
lived. 
21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause 
---- that life becomes meaningful. 
22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is 
---- probably only one which is correct. 
23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to 
---- be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person. 
24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because 
---- it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. 
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25. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers 
---- primarily his own happiness. 
26, The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the 
---- people who believe in the same thing he does. 
27. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard 
----
against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than 
by those in the opposing camp. 
28. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its 
----
own members cannot exist for long. 
29. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the 
---- truth and those who are against the truth. 
30. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's 
----
wrong. 
31. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath 
----
contempt. 
32. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the 
---- paper they are printed on. 
33. In this complicated world of ours tlie only way we can know what's 
---- going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted. 
34. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until 
----
one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects. 
35. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates 
----
whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own. 
36. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the 
---- future that counts. 
3 7. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be 
----
careful not to compromise with those who believe differently 
from the way we do. 
38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes 
----
necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all." 
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----
39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed 
important social and moral problems don't really understood 
what's going on. 
----
40. Most people just don't lmow what's good for them. 
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Appendix B: Questions taken from Rogers & Skinner 
The following questions are taken from the speech by Carl Rogers. 
Questions 1-15--Rogers Scale. 
T F 
T F 
T F 
1. Rogers said "it's clear that some of the most basic concepts of 
this new third force in psychology have no meaning at all for the 
behaviorist group. " 
2. Rogers said "there is a fresh breeze blowing in our land that is 
expressed by an in te rest in such things as: 
a) ontological thought d) Zen Buddhism 
b) existentialism e) £ and i 
c) behaviorism 
3. This fresh breeze is also, according to Rogers, exhibited by 
what Maslow calls: 
a) a new force in psychology c) the new third force in psychology 
b) the primary force d) the two older forces in psychology 
4. Rogers said "man has felt himself to be but a puppet in life, 
whirled by economic and world forces." 
5. Rogers feels in sympathy with this new "fresh breeze" because: 
a) He himself feels this way 
b) The new books he's read tell him it is so 
c) It is deeply in line with his experience in working with clients 
in therapy 
d) Other therapists have told him it is so 
6. Rogers has described therapeutic development as a self-initiated 
process of learnin g to be free. 
7. The sense of freedom which Rogers' clients feel is: 
a) an outward choice of alternatives 
b) an inner experience within the person 
c) both~ and~ 
d) neither~ or~ 
8. According to Rogers, human freedom and the complete deter-
minism of modern science are: 
a) incom patible 
b) coexist in a non-paradoxical way 
c) existing along side each other as a paradox 
d) in no way related 
T F 9. According to Rogers, man can only live as an object. 
10. According to Rogers, 
ourselves at: 
a) no peril 
b) a little peril 
we can deny the subjective element in 
c) moderate peril 
d) great peril 
11. The subjective side of ourselves a) precedes b) follows 
c) is unrelated to: our scientific activities. 
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T F 12. Rogers states that one day the future development of the behavioral 
sciences will contradict the basic fact that the subjective side of 
our personality is an essential part of being human. 
13. Rogers says that to the experimental positivist behaviorist stream 
of psychology the term "freedom" has: 
a) some meaning c) a great deal of meaning 
b) no meaning d) he didn't say it at all 
14. To the extent that a behaviorist point of view in psychology is 
leading toward a disregard of the person or toward treating 
people as manipulable objects it is: 
a) a fundamental error by the behaviorist 
b) something Rogers must question very deeply 
c) compatible with Rogers' philosophy 
d) something Rogers likes and encourages 
T F 15. Behaviorism's disregard of persons or its treating persons as 
manipulable objects, is, according to Rogers, compatible with 
some of life's strongest undercurrents. 
The following questions are taken from the speech by B. F. Skinner; 
Questions 1-15--Skinner Scale. 
T F 
1. As a plausible working assumption for science, Skinner states that: 
a) none of human behavior is controlled 
b) some behavior is controlled 
c) most behavior is controlled 
d) all behavior is controlled 
2. By control of behavior Skinner is talking about, for example, that 
type of control as i s achieved in economics by wage systems which 
mobili zes and energizes people. 
T F 
T F 
T F 
3. By control, Skinner is not talking about the various police and 
military forces which governments use to keep people working 
within certain legal frameworks. 
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4 . In cases where the control of people breaks down as in the cas e of 
the hobo who stops working, student who skips school; this is due to : 
a) free choise of those persons 
b) disillusionment 
c) all variables affecting control of behavior are not being 
manipulated, thus, control of those persons was not 100% 
5. The fact that man is completely controlled by his genetic and 
environmental history means that in no way can man control his 
own destiny, according to Skinner. 
6. Skinner said that in light of the environment-controlling man, 
man controls himself as a species by working upon: 
a) the environmental forces c) neither ! or ~ 
b) the genetic forces d) both ! and ~ 
7. Skinner defines control as: 
a) never really defined it 
b) something science hasn't yet been able to define 
c) any cont-:ibution which is made toward determining a man's 
actions 
d) getting someone to do something without their realizing "why" 
8. Our world is a world, according to Skinner, which man has wor ked 
out largely because: 
a) he wanted to have a nicer world 
b) it is a hostile world 
c) of its bearing on man's behavior 
d) man's nature has been to have progressed in his world 
9. If it is true, according to Skinner, that human behavior is 100% 
the product of a genetic and environmental history, it is neverth e-
less true that man has created and can modify that history and in 
that sense he can control himself. 
10. One of Skinner's critics said that Skinner represents the dead-end of: 
a) Marx e) Lenin 
b) Einstein f) ! and ~ 
c) McClellan g) ! and.£ 
d) Darwin h) none of these 
11. Skinner said that historically early peoples hunted and fished 
because: 
a) they liked to 
b) they were reinforced for hunting and fishing with 
something edible 
c) it was an accidental discovery, passed on through the ages 
d) they had a goal (to eat) and invented hunting and fishing 
techniques as a means to achieve that goal 
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T F 12. The inner control (an individual's self-control) as an alternative 
to external control is not a real alternative according to Skinner; 
it is nothing but the product of another kind of external control. 
13. Skinner says man, to be controlled, must be: 
a) unaware of control c) totally aware of control 
b) somewhat aware of d) may be aware or unaware of control 
control 
T F 14. Skinner states that you can prove that all of the behavior of 
human organisms is controlled 100%. 
T F 15. Skinner said that there is more than one scientific method and 
more than one way of knowing. 
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Appendix C: Skinner 
SKINNER: I don't believe you could ever prove that all of the behavior of a 
human organism is controlled. But the assumption, is, I think, more and more 
plausible, at least as a working assumption for a science. And I believe, also, 
as a working assumption for a more general consideration regarding human 
affairs in general. Now, Dr. Rogers in conceding this much has tended to 
narrow the notion of control. In the paper that I refer to, he cites as examples 
of recent advances in controlling behavior; the evidence that under certain social 
conditions a man may be led to make judgments which are contrary to the 
evidence of his senses. In other experiments it has been shown that a person 
may change his opinion without his being aware of what has influenced him to do 
so. He has cited satisfying electrical stimulation as an all-compelling kind of 
gratification that might very well be used to control behavior, and, of course, 
the effect of drugs in producing vivid hallucinations. Changes in disposition, 
personality would also be cited by Dr. Rogers. Now, but control means, to me 
much more than this. These particular examples are examples of surreptitous 
control. Control, where the controlee is not aware that he is being controlled. 
Or they are special examples of powerful control. Now what I am talking about 
when I say the control of human behavior is any contribution which is made 
toward determining a man's action. It does not need to be surreptitous, it does 
mean that the man may not be fully aware of what is being done to him and it 
does not mean that it will be 100% successful. I'm talking about such controls 
as is achieved in economics with various wage systems, the ordinary, rather 
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ineffective ones or special incentive wages and so on. One has only to examine 
other nations, other cultures, to appreciate the extent to which in America our 
economic system does energize people. It makes them productive, it makes 
them enterprising; undertaking new kinds of things. I mean by control the 
various police and military forces which governments use to keep people working 
within a certain legal framework . I mean by control the various techniques 
which are used in education to bring about what we call the acquisition of knowl-
edge or traits of character, and so on. Now the fact that occasionally an 
employee doesn't go to work for the day or occasionally a man becomes a hobo 
and stops working altogether or the fact that a student plays hooky or that some-
one breaks the law or escapes from jail; this does not mean to me that these are 
not very powerful controlling influences. The exceptions are to be expected, 
because in no one of these cases are the variables which are manipulated the 
only variables and, hence, the control is not 100%. So, I hope that when we are 
talking here about control we will speak more generally and not limit this to a 
concealed control; although there are special problems involved there, I'll admit 
and would not, also hope to deal only with 100% effective control. Now, that is 
one thing that I wanted to state in these early remarks and I think that it will 
come up again in the discussion. Another one has to do with the implications of 
the notion that human behavior is controlled; and thus for the moment let's talk 
about complete control. Another one of my valued opponents in this line of 
thinking is Joseph Woodcroach, whose book The Measure of Man published in 
1954 is largely an attack on Walden Two, my utopian novel and also on other 
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works of mine. He's recently returned to the attack in an article in the 
Saturday Review of Literature in which suddenly I find myself classed with the 
existentialists but being cited by Croach symbolizing what he calls the dead end 
of the tendency represented by Darwin and Marx and he cites me as denying 
categorically and absolutely that man has any control over his destiny, that he 
has any power to choose or determine. And he goes on to document this by 
saying that I write in my book, Science and Human Behavior, "the inner man 
who is held responsible for the behavior of the external, biological organism 
is only a pre-scientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are discovered 
in the course of a scientific analysis. And all these causes lie outside the 
individual and he goes on from this dead-end. The fact that man is (let us assume 
for the moment) completely controlled by hi genetic and environmental history 
does not in any sense mean that he cannot control his own destiny. He's already 
been doing this both in the field of genetics and in the field of the environment; 
because from the very beginning of civilization or culture, man, as we know 
him, man has been working upon the very genetic and environmental forces 
which are responsible for him. And the geneticists, today, are beginning to 
talk quite openly about the possibility of improvements in man through genetic 
measures; just yesterday I read the report in the morning paper that Professor 
Huxley has come out again in favor of sperm banks or special donor fathership 
so that in the world of the future the father will be proud not that the child is of 
his own blood; but that he has the best blood that money can buy. The environ-
mental control is already here and has been here for thousands of years. Man 
is largely responsible for the environment in which man lives; he's certainly 
responsible for this very pleasant environment here this afternoon in every 
detail. We live more and more in a man-made world and it has been a world 
which man has worked out largely because of its bearing upon his behavior. 
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He's reduced the need to escape from extremes of temperature and so on. He 
has come to be reasonably comfortable, well-fed and can then devote ourselves 
to things which are more important. This is a contribution of a purely technical, 
physical technology; but the social technology and the cultural technology which 
has gone along with this is even more important. What man has done is to create 
for himself a world in which he is governed, in which he is employed, in which 
he can hire, in which he can gain the necessary wealth through borrowing or 
stealing or something of that kind. He has built a world in which he is able to 
behave in ways which would otherwise be impossible. And, in a sense, he has 
controlled himself. If it is true that human behavior is 100% the product of a 
genetic and environmental history, it is nonetheless true that man has created 
and can modify that genetic and environmental history and, in that sense, he can 
control himself. Now, that is not a pun, I'm not playing on words here. Very 
often it is true that the man who builds the environment, is not th e man who is 
controlled by it: but that is often the case. And as I write elsewhere, the 
techniques of self-control which we can expect from religious, ethical and moral 
works of the past can be analyzed in terms of a manipulation of an environment 
with the result that the man who has, thus manipulated the environment will 
behave in a way that will cause him less trouble or gain him greatest achievements. 
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So that we do control ourselves, even in a world in which human behavior is 
totally controlled because we modify that behavior. Now, this may seem, 
again, even if you don't regard it as a play on words; it may seem logically 
impossible; but the point is that we do this, not because even then we step 
outside any causal stream or outside the stream of history but because it 
happens to be in mans' nature to take steps of this sort. This brings me to 
third theme which we will certainly be dealing with again and again, I'm sure, 
in this debate. This is the so-called choice of values. Why do we in controlling 
man control him in one direction and not in another ? How do we decide in 
advance how we want to control ? This comes up in the case of education. 
Suppose we have a very powerful educational technique; what will you teach? If 
psychology can tell you the techniques can it tell you what ought to be taught? 
Now, this is a whole field of value judgment, but I don't think it need necessarily 
be put outside the realm of science. As far as I'm concerned there's only one 
science, there's only one way of knowing and that may be in the hands of 
scientists or in others' but it comes to the same thing. I don't know of any 
special wisdom which is available when science must stop and turn the choice 
of values over to others. As I see the question of values, they concern some 
characteristics of human behavior which have led Lo various kinds of explora-
tions in the design of culture. We could explain some activities of man in the 
face of physical technology by appealing to the immediate results. Early 
people hunt and fish for food because in hunting and fishing you are reinforced 
immediately with something edible. Later, a culture develops methods of 
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storing food, drying, preserving, freezing; they develop methods of agriculture--
where something must be done in the early spring and you eat only in late August 
or September, perhaps and so on. Slowly a culture builds the capacity to do 
things because of more and more remote consequences. Now this is also true in 
the case of the cultural technology which man has worked out. A strong man, 
able to whip anyone else in a battle will steal and take from others, will force 
him to labor for him, and so on. This becomes an early, primitive kind of 
governmental strucutre. And we explain it in terms of the immediate reinforce-
ment of the strong man who is capable of exerting that kind of power. Later, a 
government which becomes more sensible in its long-term consequences, will 
work out ways of controlling which will not resort to brute force and will have 
a greater survival value in the long run; because such governments will make 
better use of the people governed . And I think as you can trace a physical 
technology, the becoming important of more and more remote consequences so 
you can trace this in cultural technology. And, I think this brings us to my way 
of thinking, the crucial issue. Dr. Rogers has referred to the suggestion that 
there are three ways of looking at human behavior, the Freudian, or the positiv-
istic-behaviorists or that way (I haven't a name for it) which emphasizes the self 
or that the individual becomes interested in the self as a source of wisdom, 
source of strength in altering conduct. My colleague , David McClellan, has 
written a book on psychoanalysis and religion which has taken the same theme 
but has left out, I suppose, the positivistic view. McClellan, taking his cue 
from David Bahan's very interesting book on Freud's sources has noted that the 
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Protestant Reformation and the Jewish Hasidic mystical movement and Freud 
from the latter in his psychoanalysis all exemplify the kind of revolt against 
external control. This is the conflict in between psychoanalysis and govern-
mental operations. It is the general turning to the individual to find salvation. 
This is the theme, of course, of the Protestant Reformation; that one can seek 
one's God within himself. And Freud carries this out, hoping to find within the 
individual the source of a pattern of life which is not imposed from the outside. 
Now, I don't think that is the correct way of stating the case and I think it can 
be modified in a way which fits my purposes very well. The change is not from 
an external control of the individual to internal control, it is a change from 
coercive, punitive control to other techniques of control which are related in 
the long run as you won't be surprised to hear me say, to positive reinforce-
ment. There are ways in which yo u can control people, so that you influence 
what they want to do and there ate ways in which you control them so that they 
are forced to do what they do not want to do. If you shift from a legalistic, 
coercive system, to individual freedom (this is the whole theory of democracy 
too) it appears to take the good behavior of the individual out of the hands of the 
police and turn it over to the individual himself. I suggest, as a subject for 
future discussion here, that it would turn out that the inner control which is then 
discovered as an alternative to the ext e rnal is nothing but the product of another 
kind of external control which has been concerned with getting individuals to 
want to behave in certain ways rather then coercing them to behave in those 
ways because of an external threat. As I see the trend of the evolution of culture, 
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it is away from the rather immediate, punitive successful ways of controlling 
people to those more remote techniques which are based upon a knowledge of 
human behavior require a very sensitive understanding of these techniques 
which in the long run exert a much more powerful control, and a control which 
I believe is more likely to build a stronger group because it releases resources, 
and here I would agree with Dr. Ro ;:;ers, of the individual which are quite lost 
under aversive control. Those are the three themes I wanted to mention. We 
do agree that behavior is controlled; but I want ed to interpret that broadly. We, 
I hope, agree that even on an assumption of complete determinism man is and 
ha s been free to dete r mine his destiny by the design of the world which deter-
mines him. And th at the slow evolution of culture practices could very well be 
working towards the releasing of potentialities of the individual without 
neces sarily, thereby, leaving it in the last analysis to the individual to deter-
mine his own behav ior. 
68 
Appendix D: Rogers 
ROGERS: I'd like to try to summarize, very briefly, some of the important 
elements which underly our dialog as they seem to me. I think there's a fresh 
breeze that's blowing through the world. It's exhibiting itself in many ways and 
speaking through many voices. It's expressed in the growing interest in 
existentialism and in the existentialist point of view. It's evident in ways that 
may seem odd to some of you, such as the interest in Zen Buddhism. It shows 
itself in the concern with the Self in psychology and in the interest in a phenome-
nological approach to psychological problems. Even on the political scene it is 
evident, I believe, in the upsurge of one new country after another arising out of 
a colonial past. It is exhibited in what Maslow has termed, "the new third force 
in American psychology," the de velopment of Self theories, the concern with 
the existential person, the discu s sions of Being and Becoming, as over against 
the two older forces; the Positivistic Behaviorism point of view and the Freudian 
point of view. As I endeavor to understand this vigorous new cultural trend, it 
s eems to me to be the voice of subjective man speaking up loudly for himself. 
Man has long felt himself to be but a puppet in life, molded by world forces and 
by economic forces. He has bee n enslaved by persons, by institutions, and 
more recently, by aspects of modern science. But he is firmly setting forth a 
new declaration of independence. He is discarding the alibis of unfreedom. He 
is choosing himself, endeavoring to become himself; not a puppet, not a slave, 
not a copy of some model; but his own unique, individual self. He is saying in 
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no uncertain terms: "I am, I exist, I choose myself in life. I choose the 
meaning of death. " I find myself very sympathetic to this trend because it is 
so deeply in line with the experience I have had in working with clients in 
therapy. As one therapist has said, "the essence of therapy is the client's 
movement from feeling unfree and controlled by others towards the frightening, 
but rewarding, sense of freedom to map out and choose his new personality. I, 
myself, in one of the papers that some of you have read, have described the 
therapeutic development as a "self-initiated process of learning to be free." 
This learning is composed of movement from, as well as movement toward. 
From being persons driven by inner forces they do not understand, fearful 
and distrustful of these deeper feelings and of themselves, living by values they 
have taken from others they move significantly. They move toward being 
persons who accept and even enjoy their own feelings, who value and trust the 
deeper layers of their nature; who find strength in being their own uniqueness, 
who live by values that they experience. This learning, this movement, enables 
them to live as more individuated, more creative, more responsive and more 
responsible persons. Clients ar e , as I have tried to indicate, often sharply 
aware of such directions in them s elves as they move with fearfulness toward 
being freely themselves. But how can I talk about freedom, when as a behavioral 
scientist I conduct research on the assumption that the sequences of cause and 
effect operate quite as much in the psychological as in the physical world? 
What possible definition of freedom can there be in a modern world? Let me 
try to tell you what it means to me, again quoting from one of these papers. In 
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the first place, the freedom which my clients experience is essentially an inner 
thing; something which exists in the living person, quite aside from any outward 
choice of alternatives which we so often think of as constituting freedom. I am 
speaking of the kind of freedom which Frankl vividly describes in his experience 
of the concentration camp, when everything: possessions, identity, choice of 
alternatives was taken from the prisoners. But even months and years in such 
an environment showed only, and I quote, "that everything can be taken from a 
man, but one thing, the last of the human freedoms to choose one's own attitude 
in any given set of circumstances; to choose one's own way." It is this inner, 
subjective, existential freedom which I have observed. It is the realization in 
my clients that, "I can live myself, here and now, by my own choice." It is the 
quality of courage which enables a person to step into the uncertainty of the 
unknown, as he chooses himself. It is the discovery of meaning from within 
oneself; meaning which comes from listening sensitively and openly to the com-
plexities of what one is experiencing. It is the burden of being responsible for 
the self one chooses to be. It is the recognition, by the person, that he is an 
emerging process, not a static end-product. The individual who is thus deeply 
and courageously thinking his own thoughts, becoming his own uniqueness, 
responsibly chosing himself may be fortunate in having hundreds of objective 
outer alternatives from which to chose, or he may be unfortunate in having 
none; but his freedom exists, regardless. So, we are first of all, speaking of 
something which exists within the individual; of something phenomenological 
rather than objective--but, nonetheless, to be prized. The second point in 
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defining this experience of freedom is that it exists, not as a contradiction to 
the picture of the psychological universe as a sequence of cause and effect, but 
as a compliment to such a universe. Freedom, rightly understood, is a fulfill-
ment by the person, of the ordered sequence of his life. As Martin Buber puts 
it, "the free man believes in destiny and believes that it stands in need of him.'' 
He moves out voluntarily, freely, responsibly; to play his significant part in a 
world whose determined events move through him and through his spontaneous 
choice and will. This is the experience of one client after another as he moves 
in therapy toward an acceptance of the realities of the world outside and inside 
himself and also moves toward becoming a responsible agent in this real world. 
As I've indicated before, this significant human freedom exists alongside the 
complete determinism of modern science as a paradox. It exists in our human 
experience with as much reality as do the facts of science, and we cannot wisely 
disregard it, It's one of the great contributions of our century that we are 
beginning to realize that man's moods, attitudes, actions, his adaptations, as 
well as his malada.ptations, can be understood in the same lawful terms as the 
events as the physical world. Viewed from this objective perspective, it seems 
probable that we will increasingly be able to understand man's actions in terms 
of laws which will be similar to the scientific laws discovered in the natural 
sciences. It is this that leads to the possibility of being able to control human 
behavior. It is this that leads to the issue of this discussion. There seems no 
doubt but that the behavioral sciences will move steadily in the direction of 
making man an object to himself ; a complex sequence of events no different in 
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kind from the complex chain of equations by which various chemical substances 
interact to form new substances or to release energy. But no matter how com-
pletely man comes to understand himself as a determined phenomenon; the 
product of past elements and forces and the determined cause of future events 
and behaviors, he can never live as an object. He can only live subjectively. 
Some of the most pathetic individuals I know are those who are continually 
attempting to understand and predict their behavior objectively. Each action is 
meaningful to them only as the predetermined effect of preceding causes and 
their whole life becomes an unhappy caricature of the centipede self-consciously 
watching his feel. In my experience some of the failures in psychoanalytic 
therapies sometimes exhibit this over-intellectualized objectivity towards them-
selves. But the person who is developing his full potential is able to accept 
this subjective aspect of himself and to live subjectively. When he's angry, he 
is angry. Not merely "an exhibition of the effects of adrenalin." When he loves, 
he's loving; and not merely "cathected toward a love-object." He moves in self-
selected directions. He chooses responsibly. He's a person who thinks and 
feels and experiences. He is not merely an object in whom these events occur. 
We cannot, without great peril, deny this subjective element in ourselves. It 
precedes our scientific activities; it's more all-encompassing than scientific 
knowledge. It is an essential part of being human, of being a person. And no 
present or future development of the behavioral sciences can ever contradict 
this basic fact. Yet, I am very well aware that the experimentalist, positivist, 
behaviorist, stream of thought in psychology (and Dr. Skinner is a most able 
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exponent of that trend) hold very different views. For example, here are some 
of the words and concepts that I have used which are totally or almost totally 
without meaning in the behaviorist' s frame of reference. Freedom, for example, 
is a term with no meaning. Choice, in the sense that I have used it, has no 
meaning. Subjectivity is, I believe, regarded as of very little importance. 
Purpose, self-direction, value or value-choice; none of these have any meaning. 
Personal responsibility, as a concept, has no meaning. The democratic 
philosophy of human nature, Dr. Skinner has pointed out, has been a useful 
resource of the revolutionists in the past, but is now, very probably, out of 
date. So it's clear that some of the most basic concepts of this new third force 
in psychology have no meaning at all for the behaviorist group. I trust that this 
dialog today may help us to clear up any misunderstandings of such differences 
and also to clarify our differences where real differences do exist. In summary, 
I would say that to the extent that a behaviorist point of view in psychology is 
leading us toward a disregard of the person or toward treating persons, 
primarily, as manipulable objects, or toward control of the person, shaping up 
his behavior without his participant choice, or toward minimizing the significance 
of the subjective; then I question it very deeply. My experience would lead me to 
say that to that extent it's going against one of the strongest undercurrents of 
modern life and is taking us down a pathway with destructive consequences. 
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